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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article VIII § 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Assuming this Court concludes that summary judgment was

improperly awarded defendant Curtis Industries, Inc. ("Curtis"),
defendant B & B Amusements Corporation ("B & B") should not be
forced to relitigate this suit. The standard of review involving
decisions of summary judgment is as stated by the plaintiff in
her brief; however, there is no legal support requiring this case
to be relitigated as to defendant B & B.
II.

The trial court did not err as a matter of law in

ruling that the standard of care of a common carrier was not
appropriate in evaluating B & B's duty toward the plaintiff.
Plaintiff has likewise appropriately stated the standard of
review governing a trial court's refusal to give jury
instructions.
III.

Should this Court consider plaintiff's arguments on

appeal concerning testimony offered by B & B's expert witness at
trial when plaintiff herself failed to properly object to this
testimony during trial?
This Court will not consider arguments on appeal where the
party failed to object during trial below.

In the absence of a

transcript as part of a record on appeal, this Court assumes that
proceedings at trial were regular and proper and that the trial
court's judgment was supported by competent and sufficient
evidence.

Bevan v. J. H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442 (Utah

1983); accord Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931, 934 (Utah 1979); In
re Estate of Thorlev, 579 P.2d 927, 930 (Utah 1978).
The absence of a transcript precludes a
meaningful review of the district court's
denial of [plaintiff's] requests from relief
from the judgment, . . • ; "appellate review
of factual matters can be meaningful,
orderly, and intelligent only in
juxtaposition to a record by which lower
courts' rulings and decisions on disputes can
be measured. In this case, without a
transcript no such record was available and,
therefore no measurement of the district
court's action can be made as urged upon [the
Supreme Court] by [the plaintiff]."
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) (quoting Sawyers
v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09 (Utah 1976)).
IV.

Assuming this Court chooses to consider plaintiff's

argument regarding expert testimony plaintiff did not properly
object to during trial, it was not clearly erroneous for the
trial court to allow evidence offered by B & B's expert to be
admitted at trial when (1) there is no support for plaintiff's
claim that she was surprised by such testimony; (2) plaintiff was
informed long before trial regarding B & B's theory involving the
use of such expert testimony; (3) plaintiff opened the door for
such testimony through the testimony of her own expert witness;
(4) testimony by B & B's expert was competent; (5) the evidence
offered by B & B's expert was relevant and probative in regard to
the very claims plaintiff presented; and (6) the flawed-bolt
evidence offered by B & B's expert did not necessarily affect the
jury's verdict.
This Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on
questions involving the admissibility of evidence unless it
2

clearly appears the lower court was in error.

See State v. Gray,

717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886,
893 n.23 (Utah 1989).

Assuming that this Court determines the

trial court clearly erred in admitting evidence, such error
requires reversal only if this Court concludes that absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the party claiming the error.
P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).

State v. Mitchell, 779

"[A]n error is harmful only if the

likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently high as to
undermine [this Court's] confidence in the verdict."

Crookston

v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991)
(citation omitted).
V.

Plaintiff has not met her burden on appeal of

marshalling all evidence in support of the jury's verdict before
arguing as she now does that there was not reasonably sufficient
evidence to overcome her belief in the inference of B & B's
negligence.
A party claiming that the evidence does
not support a jury's verdict carries a heavy
burden. The evidence is considered in the
light most supportive of the verdict, [and
the appellate court] will not substitute
[its] judgment for that of the jury where the
verdict is supported by substantial and
competent evidence. To successfully attack
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all
the evidence supporting the verdict and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support it.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted).

3

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in part
that "[ejrror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected."
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Relevant Evidence means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Also, Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the
State of Utahf statute or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Finally, Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
HARMLESS ERROR
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect
in any ruling or order or in anything done or
admitted by the court or by any of the
parties, is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case. This is an appeal from a jury

verdict concluding that B & B was not negligent regarding an
amusement ride accident.

4

B.

Course and disposition of proceedings below.

Plaintiff

filed suit against B & B and Curtis to recover damages for what
she alleged were serious permanent injuries she sustained as a
result of a minor amusement ride accident involving the parties.
The court granted summary judgment to defendant Curtis. The
court also ruled that the common carrier standard of care did not
apply in considering defendant B & B's duty toward the plaintiff.
Finally, during trial, plaintiff's expert "opened the door" to
expert testimony later offered by B & B's expert, which evidence
by B & B's expert came in without objection by plaintiff during
trial and which evidence was otherwise relevant, probative,
competent and admissible.
C.
1.

Statement of relevant facts.
On August 31, 1989, and January 29, 1990, plaintiff

filed her Second and Third Amended Complaints respectively in
this action alleging in part that based upon defendant B & B's
contention and discovery plaintiff obtained, defendant Curtis
manufactured and sold to B & B a defective machine bolt which
B & B used to connect cars of a roller coaster that plaintiff
alleged became disconnected resulting in her claimed injuries.
(R. at 92, 123-32.)
2.

In those complaints, plaintiff also alleged that at the

time Curtis manufactured the bolt and sold the same to B & B the
bolt was in a defective condition that was unreasonably
dangerous, resulting in plaintiff's injuries.
32.)

5

(R. at 93-94, 123-

3.

On or about February 6, 1990, the affidavit of B & B's

expert, P. Thomas Blotter, was filed with the court referencing
in part that "the failure of the bolt was not the result of
operation or maintenance practices" involving B & B.

(R. at 149

(emphasis added).)
4.

Contemporaneous with the filing of the affidavit of its

expert, B & B filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting
memorandum and citations to the record indicating that a broken
bolt had caused plaintiff's injuries, if any, and that based upon
testimony elicited it was not negligent in the operation of the
roller coaster.

B & B also argued to the court that plaintiff's

allegations based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
dismissed since there was no evidence that the elements of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine had been met including proof that the
accident was a kind which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care been observed.

(R. at 136-

154.)
5.

In opposing B & B's motion for summary judgment,

plaintiff reiterated her understanding of B & B's theory of the
case, namely, that the subject bolt broke and that B & B's expert
was competent to testify thereto and would likely so testify.
Indeed, in her memorandum in opposition to B & B's motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff (a) acknowledged that Dr. Blotter's
affidavit did not expressly state that the bolt in fact failed
but only presumes as such, (b) affirmatively argued to the court
that "a genuine dispute exists with respect to the question of
whether the bolt in fact broke"; and (c) claimed that summary
6

judgment was not proper "even if there was anything 'defective'
about the bolt when it came into B & B's possession."

(R. at

176-89 and particularly R. 179 and 185.)
6.

In plaintiff's second set of interrogatories to B & B

served on or about April 27, 1989, plaintiff herself posed
questions regarding testing of the bolts and the bolt's internal
structure in inquiring whether B & B had ever performed any
"periodic non-destructive testing, x-ray testing, or any other
testing of the bolts (including the one which you claim broke)
which hold the cars of the subject roller coaster together."
(See Answer 15 to plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories.)
7.

On or about May 14f 1990, defendant Curtis filed its

motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum which again
placed plaintiff on notice concerning the substance of the
anticipated trial testimony involving analysis of whether the
bolt failed and may have been defective.
8.

(R. at 214-22.)

On May 29, 1990, plaintiff filed her opposition to

Curtis' motion for summary judgment and again acknowledged
therein her awareness of the "defective bolt" argument by
claiming that the issue of whether the bolt failed was for the
jury to decide and by acknowledging that B & B's contention was
that B & B was not negligent but that the bolt in fact failed.
(See R. 229-33.)
9.

On August 17, 1990, B & B filed a memorandum in support

of its position that the standard of ordinary care should be
applied to B & B at trial.

(R. 271-82.)

7

10.

On June 4, 1990, the court held a hearing regarding the

defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Therein, B & B's

counsel again stated on the record for the court and plaintiff's
counsel that it was B & B's theory that the bolt failed.
(R. 548.)

Also in that hearing before the court, plaintiff's

counsel essentially admitted on the record that he knew B & B was
claiming that a defective bolt had broken thus justifying
plaintiff's suit as against defendant Curtis Industries.
at 20.)

(R. 548

Plaintiff's counsel also admitted that the jury could

possibly find that the bolt broke and attribute fault to
defendant Curtis; and when asked by the court what evidence was
going to be adduced to show that the bolt was defective,
plaintiff's counsel stated that either plaintiff or B & B would
likely present evidence during trial that the bolt broke and that
the defective bolt was purchased from defendant Curtis
Industries.
11.

(R. 548 at 27, 34.)

On August 23, 1990, after plaintiff made her

representations to the court in the June hearing, plaintiff filed
her objection to B & B's designation of witnesses and exhibits
urging the court not to allow B & B's expert, Thomas Blotter, to
testify as to failure of the defective bolt by reason of the fact
that B & B had not supplemented its answers to one of plaintiff's
interrogatories.

No allegation of prejudice was raised.

(See R.

293-96.)
12.

On August 23, 1990, plaintiff filed a motion in limine

urging the court to rule that B & B could not present evidence or
argument concerning B & B's proposition that the subject bolt
8

failed and was "defective."

Again, it was plaintiff's sole

position that since defendant had not concisely answered one of
her interrogatories, B & B should be prohibited from presenting
evidence at trial on its theory of the case.
13.

(R. 300-02.)

On August 23, 1990, plaintiff filed a reply to B & B's

objection to plaintiff's late designation of witnesses thereby
essentially incongruently claiming that even though B & B should
not be allowed to present its theory of the case because of
B & B's "technical failure" to supplement its answer to
interrogatories, B & B could not be surprised by plaintiff's
"technical failure" in untimely designating economic loss and
fact witnesses who should be allowed to testify since the civil
procedure rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
(R. 303-06.)
14.

On August 27 1990, B & B filed its motion in limine

urging the court to limit the testimony of plaintiff's expert to
those opinions offered during his deposition since plaintiff had
failed to advise B & B of any changes in her expert's testimony.
It was B & B's contention that to allow any such expanded expert
testimony would be unduly prejudicial to the defendant and should
be precluded.. (See R. 317-20.)

This motion was eventually

denied.
15.

On August 27, 1990, the affidavit of David L. Stott,

the general counsel for the Public Service Commission of Utah,
was filed with the trial court.

In that affidavit, Mr. Stott set

forth facts clearly demonstrating that amusement park rides such
9

as that involved in the incident in question are not considered
common carriers in Utah.
16.

(See R. 346-47.)

At trial, B & B's employees repeatedly testified

concerning their extensive daily inspection procedures involving
the amusement rides and the nuts and bolts connecting the
amusement ride cars in question.

(R. 549 at 49-50, 81, 93, 102.)

Employee Corky Mertin testified that bolts involved in the roller
coaster amusement rides had never broken before.
53-54.)

(See R. 549 at

Mr. Mertin then stated that bolts had been purchased

from defendant Curtis for use on B & B's amusement rides.

(R.

549 at 56.)
17.

In contrast to plaintiff's allegations that she had

been hit from behind when a child in the following amusement car
had flown out of his seat and struck her in the head, Mr. Mertin
repeatedly testified that after the injury plaintiff had only
stated that she had bumped her knees on the front of the car and
there were no reports reflecting plaintiff's claims regarding
having been hit from behind.

(R. 549 at 60, 107-10.)

Subsequent

to the accident, employees of B & B searched for the broken bolt
which had been connecting the cars in question.

(R. 549 at 71.)

After discovering a portion of the same, Mr. Mertin testified
that the bolt did not appear abnormally worn but "looked like
[it] had snapped like a pencil."
18.

(R. 549 at 79.)

Plaintiff presented the testimony of David Clark

Stephens, her accident reconstructionist, who testified that the
case was relatively simple.

(R. 549 at 146.)

He discussed a

"fault-tree analysis" which he stated was a method of system
10

safety engineering or looking at all the possible causes for
accidents,

(R. 549 at 146-52.)

Thereafter, Mr. Stephens

testified regarding application of the bolts in question
including their intended tensile strength and designed ability to
withstand force.

Mr. Stephens was then asked by plaintiff's

counsel to discuss his fault-tree analysis with respect to the
alleged coupling-device failure and alleged lap-bar failure of
the car behind.

(R. 549 at 153-59.)

In addressing the question

posed by plaintiff's counsel himself, plaintiff's own expert
testified that the bolt could have broken.
19.

(R. 549 at 188-89.)

Thereafter, during voir dire examination by B & B's

counsel, plaintiff's expert admitted that he had had no formal
post-high school training in material stress analysis and no
formal education concerning the studies of vibrations, rigid body
dynamics, machine design, or engineering.

(R. 549 at 196-97.)

Nevertheless, plaintiff's expert volunteered that one of the
possibilities for the failure was a defective bolt due to
"hydrogen impregnation during cadmium plating of a bolt while it
is being manufactured," which, as plaintiff's expert testified,
was "the only other possibility [for the accident] that even
[B & B's expert was] going to be able to come up with."

(R. 549

at 198.)
20.

Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's own expert again

stressed without objection by plaintiff that the most probable
defect in a bolt would be one resulting from hydrogen
impregnation and that he "recognize[d] that a flaw could exist in

11

the wire that the bolt was manufactured out of."

(R. 549 at

221.)
21.

Plaintiff's own expert also offered on cross-

examination the following testimony: "I am sure that if the bolt
had a flaw that reduced the tensile strength by 80 percent, it
would never get sold on the open market."

(R. 549 at 222.)

And

plaintiff's expert admitted that there are such things as
"Taiwanese counterfeit bolts."
22.

(R. 549 at 222-23.)

In connection with plaintiff's allegation that the

restraining bar in the car behind her failed causing a child in
that car to be flung forward striking plaintiff in the head,
plaintiff's expert conceded on cross-examination that he had made
no calculation regarding the same, did not know how far the bar
extended, had made no specific measurements in connection with
the restraint system, had made no calculations as to whether a
child would be thrown completely from the car given a bar
failure, had made no specific calculations other than "a lot of
thought" as to the forces involved and the physics connected with
the factors allegedly resulting in the accident and had never
even measured the coupling joints of the amusement car in
question.
23.

(R. 549 at 226-35.)
Further, during re-direct plaintiff's counsel himself

continued to ask questions of plaintiff's expert regarding the
defective manufacturing of bolts and elicited the testimony that
the problem with counterfeit bolts was "that the basic strength
of material is reduced, so that with either shear or tension, it
is going to have a lower failure value."
12

(R. 549 at 239-40.)

24.

Plaintiff testified at trial that prior to the accident

she had been dismissed from her employment since she was not able
to perform her duties satisfactorily and subsequent to the
accident had been terminated from other employment for reasons
unrelated to the accident.
25.

(R. 550 at 250-55.)

Plaintiff also admitted she had had headaches in the

past, she had suffered from back pain prior to the accident and
was having trouble sleeping, her back bothered her at night, she
had stiffness and spasms in her neck and pain from her neck down
into her upper middle back.

(R. 550 at 277-81.)

Plaintiff then

conceded that prior to the accident in question, she had been
involved in an automobile accident where her car slammed into a
cement post injuring her leg and her shoulder.
280-82.)

(R. 550 at

Plaintiff also testified that since the accident she

had fallen while water skiing (R. 550 at 286) and had fallen and
hurt her back while playing volleyball (R. 550 at 286-87).
26.

Upon cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that

problems with her employment occurred before her accident (R. 550
at 340) and that her finances after the accident were not much
different from her finances before.

(R. 550 at 342.)

Plaintiff

also conceded that prior to the accident, she had been previously
examined by a physician for severe headache problems (R. 550 at
349-51) which had lasted for a year.

(R. 550 at 351). At that

time years before the accident she had told the physician that
she had had trouble sleeping, awoke in the night for no apparent
reason, had felt tired and worn out, had had problems with
generalized weakness, had had problems with dizziness and trouble
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seeing, and had suffered from eye pain, double vision, ringing in
her ears, and frequent severe headaches lasting from two to five
days which increased in frequency and severity.

She also had

told the physician that she suffered with nausea, vomiting,
abdominal pains and musculoskeletal concerns.

(R. 550 at

352-54.)
27.

Plaintiff further admitted that she was taking strong

pain medication before the accident, which medication was more
potent than that prescribed for back pain such as that she
allegedly suffered in this accident.

(R. 550 at 355.)

Plaintiff

also conceded that prior to the accident underlying this suit she
had visited LDS Hospital complaining of shoulder pain and
headaches and noted on that medical record that she was taking
Tylenol 3 for back pain.
28.

(R. 550 at 356-57.)

Thereafter, plaintiff testified that she believed when

the amusement cars became disconnected her car went down the hill
and came to a stop like "slamfming] into a brick wall" causing
her to be thrown forward against the front of the car, hitting
her shins and being struck in the back of the head by a child
passenger sitting behind her.
29.

(R. 550 at 359.)

Plaintiff also conceded that although she saw blood on

the little girl behind her who had allegedly bumped into
plaintiff's head, she had never told anyone about it, she had
never obtained the child's name, she had not described this
incident in her deposition,

and she did not tell individuals at

the accident scene about being hit in the head from behind.
(R. 550 at 360-64.)
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30.

At trial, Allan Scanlin testified as an employee of a

private consulting firm that performed safety and maintenance
inspections on amusement equipment and as an ex-ride supervisor
with B & B

with supervisory responsibility for inspections.

(R. 550 at 295.)

Mr. Scanlin stated that while working for B & B

on the day of the accident he had seen the broken bolt in
question and plaintiff had not mentioned that there was another
passenger injured by the incident.

Mr. Scanlin also described

for the jury how plaintiff had only stated that she had bumped
her legs on the front of the car and had never mentioned that she
had been struck on the back of the head by another passenger in
the roller coaster.

(R. 550 at 302-03.)

Thereafter, Mr. Scanlin

identified an accident report document which referenced that the
plaintiff had only hit her legs on the front of the car and that
a bolt had broken and the car had coasted to > .;op. Mr. Scanlin
also testified without objection that the document demonstrated
that while plaintiff had only complained after the accident that
she had hurt the front of her legs, the next day she was seen on
a television news broadcast with a neck brace.

(R. 550 at 312-

13.)
31.

B & B's expert Thomas R. Blotter was called to testify

and identified himself as a professor of mechanical engineering
at Utah State University and assigned to the space dynamics lab.
He stated that he taught courses in Machine Design, Kinematics,
Vibrations, Dynamics, Stress Analysis, Theory of Elasticity,
Continuum Mechanics, and Finite Element Analysis.
380-82.)

(R. 550 at

Since plaintiff's expert had opened the door to
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Dr. Blotter's testimony, Dr. Blotter testified. without
objection, concerning the issue of counterfeit bolts and the
flaws and failings regarding the manufacturing of the same.
(R. 550 at 385-87.)

Thereafter, Dr. Blotter testified concerning

his extensive evaluation and investigation of the accident and
discussed issues involving his inspection, calculations,
measurements, and photographs taken, the speed of the roller
coaster and its stopping, slope, and maximum velocities, the
design and possible wear on the bolts, and his evaluation of the
coupling, stress
32.

and wear factors.

(R. 550 at 388-405.)

Next, Dr. Blotter was asked whether he had performed

any inspection to determine whether there were any flaws in the
coupling or the bolts; and he again responded without objection
regarding bolt flaw inspections, dye-penetrant-type tests,
fluorescent inspection, and dye-etching.
33.

(R. 550 at 405-07.)

Dr. Blotter also testified regarding reaction forces,

mathematical computations regarding inertia load and metal
strengths, modes of failure, shear distribution and stress, and
bending stress and force analysis.
34.

(R. 550 at 405-17.)

Thereafter, when Dr. Blotter was again asked to

evaluate the possibility that there may have been a flaw or
defect in the bolts, he opined without objection from plaintiff
that the possibility of a flaw in the bolt was one of several
failure modes that he investigated which may have resulted in the
accident at issue.

(R. 550 at 417-20.)

Dr. Blotter described

the affects of flaws in bolts and refuted testimony offered by
plaintiff's expert concerning wear.
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(R. 550 at 218-24.)

Thereafter he concluded ihat the most likely explanation for this
accident would be a flaw in a bolt or a counterfeit bolt.

(R.

550 at 426.)
35.

Defendant's expert otherwise entirely refuted testimony

offered by plaintiff in this case by discussing the fact that B &
B\s maintenance of the amusement ride was reasonable and that an
abrupt stop such as plaintiff claimed occurred was impossible
given mathematical velocity decelerization and impact
calculations.

Indeedt Dr

Blotter testified that the "slamming

into the brick wall" stop that plaintiff described was u reality
only equivalent to stopping at a stop sign in a normal way
without sliding.

(R. 550 at 430-40.)

Dr. Blotter also testified

that there would have been little if any forward movement from
people in passenger cars behind the plaintiff thus refuting
plaintiff's allegations she had been struck in I he back of the
head.

(R. 550 at 442.)
36.

On cross-examination plaintiff's counsel himself asked

Dr. Blotter to further discuss the issue of c ounteifeit and
flawed bolts and Dr. Blotter reiterated his opinion regarding the
same.

(K. * SO at 449f 4ci/\ 4Sf, 468-70.)
37.

On rebuttal, plaintiff testified that when the <at came

to a stop it rested at a downward angle.

(R. 551 at 43.)

Plaintiff also again conceded I hat she had never told anyone
except her attorney about another passenger striking her on the
back of the head.

(R. 551 at 488.)

In response, B & B offered

the testimony of witness Mertin who categorically stated that
when he viewed the position of the cars after the accident, the
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car in which plaintiff rode was at the bottom of the incline and
not on the downward slope as plaintiff had testified.

(R. 551 at

490.)
38.

During trial, the jury was instructed concerning

plaintiff's argument of res ipsa loquitur and told that if it
found the elements of res ipsa loquitur to exist, such conditions
could give rise to an inference that B & B was negligent, which
inference would support a verdict for plaintiff, in the absence
of any showing that offsets such inference.
39.

After trial, the jury delivered its verdict concluding

that B & B was not negligent.
40.

(See R. 377-78.)

(R. 399.)

Plaintiff filed her motion for a new trial on

September 28, 1990, claiming that she was prejudicially surprised
by the testimony offered by B & B's expert whom she had herself
decided not to depose prior to trial.
41.

(R. 412-19.)

On October 9, 1990, B & B filed its memorandum in

opposition to plaintiff's motion for a new trial conclusively
establishing that (a) there were no errors of law and assuming
such errors occurred they were waived and/or were harmless; (b)
the law did not support retrial as to B & B assuming the court
were to reverse its summary judgment as to defendant Curtis;
(c) plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that B & B was a
common carrier under the law to refute that evidence submitted by
B & B to the contrary; (d) plaintiff during her direct
examination of her own expert opened the door to the evidence of
the flawed and defective bolt offered by B & B's expert by
eliciting testimony from her expert on the issue of whether a
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flawed or defective bolt played any role in the accident; (e) the
evidence was more than sufficient to support the verdict; and
(f) plaintiff could not justifiably claim prejudicial surprise as
to Dr. Blotter's testimony.
42.

(See R. at 435-44.)

Also in support of its opposition to plaintiff's motion

for a new trial, B & B filed the affidavit of its counsel clearly
demonstrating (a) that "the plaintiff, during direct examination
of [her own expert witness], elicited testimony from plaintiff's
expert on the issue of whether a fraudulent or defective bolt
caused the accident"; (b) "that subsequently, counsel for
defendant, counsel for plaintiff, and the court discussed the
possible use of a rebuttal expert, Mr. Earl Kemp, to rebut the
evidence introduced by plaintiff's counsel concerning whether a
defective bolt caused the accident [and that] Mr. Kemp was
expected to testify on the bolt issue"; and (c) "that after being
requested by the court to see if Dr. Blotter could provide
testimony on this issue, Dr. Blotter was contacted and later
testified on the issues opened up by [plaintiff's own expert]."
(R. at 445-46.)
43.

Also set forth for the court was the fact that

plaintiff had not objected at trial to Dr. Blotter's testimony in
a timely fashion during trial thus waiving her right to request a
new trial due to any claimed error that occurred when B & B's
expert was allowed to testify regarding a flawed or defective
bolt.

(R. 439-40.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Assuming the court committed any error in granting defendant
Curtis' motion for summary judgment, such error does not mandate
retrial as to defendant B & B since (1) plaintiff was afforded
every opportunity to present her theory of the case against B & B
to the trier of fact; (2) the jury was instructed concerning
plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur and concluded that
defendant B & B was not negligent; (3) plaintiff failed to prove
her case of res ipsa loquitur as to defendant B & B; (4) an
impartial jury has already concluded that defendant B & B was not
negligent in this action; and (5) there is no controlling legal
support for plaintiff's theory that this matter must be retried
as to B & B.
II.
The trial court correctly ruled that the standard of care
involved in this case as to defendant B & B was not that required
of a common carrier given the fact that (1) plaintiff presented
no evidence that B & B should be held to this higher standard;
(2) B & B presented the undisputed testimony of state officials
that B & B was not considered a common carrier in Utah; and
(3) case law supports the conclusions that amusement ride owners
and operators are not generally held to this higher standard.
III.
Since plaintiff failed to properly preserve her argument at
trial concerning the issue of testimony offered by B & B's expert
and since plaintiff through her counsel and expert herself opened
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the door to such testimony, the trial court did not clearly err
in admitting the same.
In the alternative, if the trial court erred in admitting
such testimony any error was harmless and there is no reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the plaintiff absent
such error since (1) the evidence was overwhelming that a flaw in
the bolt likely caused the injuries claimed; (2) the plaintiff
was not surprised regarding such testimony; and (3) the jury
could have otherwise ignored such evidence and expressly
concluded that B & B's actions were not the proximate cause of
the exaggerated permanent injuries plaintiff alleged she
sustained as a result of this minor accident.
IV.
Finally, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden on appeal
of marshalling the evidence in support of the jury's verdict
before arguing the insufficiency of such evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ANY ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT CURTIS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A RETRIAL OF CLAIMS
AGAINST DEFENDANT B & B.
In Point I of plaintiff's argument on appeal, plaintiff
urges this Court to rule that the trial court incorrectly granted
summary judgment as to defendant Curtis necessitating a trial as
to Curtis and a retrial as to claims against B & B.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, however, she has offered no
controlling support for her novel theory that reversal of summary
judgment as against Curtis mandates retrial as to B & B and such
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theory is at odds with general law elsewhere, analogous Utah law
and common sense.
Defendant Curtis has adequately set forth in its brief on
appeal testimony offered by the plaintiff herself below
indicating that plaintiff's own expert agreed that no case could
be maintained as against defendant Curtis.

It certainly was not

B & B's fault that plaintiff's expert did not join in that
opinion offered by B & B's expert as to the nature of the
defective bolt causing the accident.

Nevertheless, it was

plaintiff's evident intention that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should be applied as against both defendants for the
jury's consideration.

However, even as admitted by plaintiff in

her brief on appeal the res ipsa loquitur burden was in any event
placed upon B & B which successfully proved to the jury that it
was not liable for plaintiff's claimed injuries.

(See

plaintiff's brief at 25-26.)
While B & B disputes that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was
appropriately applied in this case as against it given the fact
that plaintiff failed to meet the elements set forth by this
Court as a prerequisite to applying the same (see Dalley v. Utah
Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990)), over
defendant's objection the jury was essentially instructed to find
B & B negligent if it concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied (see R. at 377-78) and plaintiff has already
admitted that the doctrine was applied against B & B which faced
and met that challenge (see generally R. 550 at 380-470).
require B & B to retry the case it won, assuming the Court
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To now

reverses the trial court's ruling on summary judgment as to
defendant Curtis, would be improper, prejudicial, and unfair to
B & B.
In short, the jury in the instant case already considered
plaintiff's theory as to defendant B & B and concluded when
presented with all the evidence that B & B was not negligent.
Plaintiff has offered no controlling legal support for her theory
that retrial as to defendant B & B is mandated by any reversal of
the trial court's decision below as to summary judgment in favor
of defendant Curtis and instead only summarily claims that since
she was injured it must have been someone's fault and defendant B
& B should defend itself a second time to prove otherwise.

(See

plaintiff's brief at 22.)
Importantly, after the court granted defendant Curtis
summary judgment, plaintiff had the right under Utah law to at
least place Curtis on the special verdict form for the purpose of
having determined Curtis's respective proportion of fault, if
any.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-41 provides:
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant
who is a party to the litigation, may join as
parties any defendants who may have caused or
contributed to the injury or damage for which
recovery is sought, for the purpose of having
determined their respective proportions of
fault.
Further, Section 78-27-39 provides:
A trial court may, and when requested
party shall, direct the jury, if any,
separate special verdicts determining
total amount of damages sustained and
percentage or proportion of fault
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by any
to find
the
the

attributable to each person seeking recovery
and to each defendant.
(Emphasis added.)

In Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541

(Utah 1984), this Court considered the propriety of apportioning
fault under the Utah Negligence Act.

That case involved a

personal injury action brought by a roofer who was injured when
he came into contact with an electrical wire.
employed by Pride Roofing Company.

The plaintiff was

Pride was dismissed prior to

trial presumably due to the exclusivity of the workman's
compensation remedy.

When the case went to the jury, it found

Provo City Corporation, the owner of the electrical wire, seventy
percent negligent.

The jury also found the owner of the building

twenty percent negligent and the jury assessed ten percent of the
fault to Pride, which was not a party to the action.

On appeal,

this Court centered upon the correctness of the jury's verdict
and stated:
This is precisely what the jury did in this
case. It compared the negligence of Provo,
Monticello [the owner of the building] and
Pride and determined that each actor's
negligence occurred to cause plaintiff's
injury and that Pride's ten percent
negligence did not supersede Provo's seventy
percent negligence as a matter of law.
Id. at 545. Although this case was decided before Utah tort
reform legislation, there is no indication that it has been
overruled and it otherwise clearly indicates the right that
parties such as plaintiff herein would have had to join defendant
Curtis on the special verdict form for purposes of apportioning
its fault.

Given these statutes and case law, if plaintiff

wished to demonstrate that defendant Curtis was somehow liable
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for her claimed injuries, she should have joined defendant Curtis
for purposes of the special verdict form above and allowed the
jury to make her case for her by assessing some liability as to
defendant Curtis.

The fact that plaintiff evidently made a

conscientious decision not to do so should not work to the
detriment of defendant B & B which has already presented its
defense to plaintiffs theory of recovery and won at trial.
Clearly, the sole case of Westinqhouse Elevator Co. v.
Herron, 523 A.2d 723 (Pa. 1987), cited by plaintiff as support
for her proposition that B & B should be forced to retry this
case, is not controlling here and is otherwise distinguishable
from the case at hand since it involved a defendant's claim that
because trial counsel was ill and had been absent from trial it
had been denied adequate legal representation, an effective
defense and from asserting issues of joint liability.
claims have been made here.

No such

In contrast, in a closely analogous

case the court in Scott v* Webb, 641 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) held that upon remand for retrial between the plaintiff and
one defendant another defendant could not be forced to retry that
case where the error mandating retrial did not involve him and
since
[t]he rules of res judicata rest upon the
policy of protecting a party from being twice
vexed for the same cause, together with that
of achieving judicial economy in precluding a
party from relitigating the same issues.
[Plaintiff] has had his day in court with
[one defendant] and he cannot relitigate the
issues again [as to that defendant].
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Id» at 332 (citations omitted).

"The doctrine of res judicata

precludes subsequent relitigation by the same parties of a
question of law or issue of fact which has been determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction."

McGuire v. Commercial Union

Insurance Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. 1968); accord Madsen v.
Borthick, 709 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).

Principles of due process

are also violated when the rules of res judicata are ignored.
Cf. Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.
1971) ("Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel
operate only against persons who have had their day in
court . . . .") .
Since any reversal of the trial court's ruling granting
defendant Curtis summary judgment involves no error as to any
court ruling involving defendant B & B, forcing B & B to retry
this case would offend traditional res judicata principles and
notions of due process.

Certainly, after the court granted

Curtis summary judgment if plaintiff thought her claims could be
irreversibly prejudiced by trying this case against B & B alone
without defendant Curtis being present, she should have moved
under this Court's rules for an order granting an interlocutory
appeal to obtain review and possible reversal of the trial
court's granting of summary judgment to Curtis.

Her failure or

tactical decision not to do so should not ultimately work to the
prejudice of B & B.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF
CARE IN THIS CASE AND SO INSTRUCTED THE JURY.
Although plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to impose on B & B a standard of care tantamount to that
imposed on common carriers, plaintiff's position lacks merit
under the law and facts of this case.
As commentators have noted, "courts generally do not require
of [an owner or operator of an amusement ride or device] the high
degree of care expected of common carriers of passengers for
hire."

4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements and Exhibits § 88 (and cases

cited therein); see also Annotation, Liability of Owner, Lessee,
or Operator for Injury or Death on or Near Loop-O-Plane, Ferris
Wheel, Miniature Car, or Similar Rides, 86 A.L.R.2d 350 (and
cases cited therein); Annotation, Liability for Injury to One on
or Near Merry-Go-Round, 75 A.L.R.2d 792 (and cases cited
therein); Annotation, Liability to Patron of Scenic Railway,
Roller Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689 (and cases
cited therein) [collectively referred to hereinafter as
"Treatises"].

Nearly all the cases reviewed by the above-cited

commentators involved rides or devices where the passengers
surrendered themselves to the care and control of the owner or
operator of the ride.

See Treatises. While some limited number

of courts have applied a standard beyond ordinary or reasonable
care to owners and operators of amusement rides or devices,
courts generally hold that the owner or operator of such rides or
devices must only use reasonable care to see that these rides are
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properly constructed, designed, maintained, and managed and that
reasonable care in such respect is that which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and in a
like situation.

See Treatises.

In Lewis v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 396 P.2d 933 (Colo. 1964),
one of only a couple of cases relied on by the plaintiff here,
Chief Justice McWilliams, in his dissenting opinion, correctly
stated:

"[s]ome states have decreed that the duty is one of

highest care, but the general rule is that the owner and operator
of an amusement device has the less onerous duty of ordinary
care.

See, 86 A.L.R. 2d p. 350 and Am.Jur.2d, p. 212 [sic]."

Id. at 947-48 (C.J. McWilliams, dissenting).
As to roller coasters, scenic railways, or miniature
railways in particular, "[a] number of cases have specifically
defined the duty of care owed by the owner or operator of a
roller coaster, miniature railway, or the like, as that of
ordinary or reasonable care, in the construction, maintenance,
and operation of the amusement facility, for the safety of
patrons."

4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements and Exhibits § 90, at 215.

This is the general view.

See id.

(and cases cited therein);

Annotation, Liability to Patrons of Scenic Railway, Roller
Coaster, or Miniature Railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689 (and cases cited
therein).
In holding that owners or operators of amusement rides are
held to the standard of ordinary care of a reasonable owner or
operator in like circumstances, courts have discussed the
distinctions between a common carrier and an owner or operator of
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an amusement park device and the rationale which supports the
imposition of the reasonable care standard.

For example, in

Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc., 250 Ga. 352, 297 S.E.2d
469 (1982), the Georgia Supreme Court held:
We disagree with [plaintiff's] contention
that [the amusement ride] is a public
conveyance, therefore rendering Six Flags a
carrier owing its passengers an extraordinary
duty of care under Ga. Code §§ 18-201 and 18204.
We find it easy to distinguish between
operation of elevators, taxicabs, buses, and
railroads, which are instruments of
transportation that must be used by people to
travel from one place to another, and
operation of [the amusement ride] and similar
instruments, which are not. Passengers board
elevators and amusement rides with dissimilar
expectations. Persons using ordinary
transportation devices, such as elevators and
buses, normally expect to be carried safely,
securely, and without incident to their
destination. Amusement ride passengers
intend to be conveyed thrillingly to a place
at, or near to, the point they originally
boarded, so that carriage is incidental.
There is no transport involved with [the
amusement ride]. Its riders seek a sensation
of speed and movement for the sake of
entertainment and thrills. [The amusement
ride] is not a public conveyance within the
meaning of Ga. Code Ann. §18-201. The
standard of care owned by the proprietor,
owner, and operator of an amusement device
. . . is a duty of ordinary care to his
passengers.
Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in reversing the lower court's imposition of the
common carrier standard of care on an owner and operator of an
amusement ride the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled:
The proper standard then to be applied
to the present defendant's conduct in this
case is that of the ordinary care of a
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reasonably prudent man under the
circumstances. If he uses a measure of care
and diligence proportioned to the occasion,
its possibilities and its dangers, he has
fulfilled his legal duty. Dickerson v. Conn.
Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518. The trial
court erred in its charge as to the character
of care required.
It may be said that there is ample
justification for the ruling made in the fact
that the revolving cars or boats are quite
similar to the moving trains upon a railroad
in the motive power employed and in the
considerable hazard of operation of each.
But the rule applied is not governed bv such
considerations, but rather founded upon the
occasion of use of the respective
instrumentalities. One traveling upon his
lawful occasions must perforce use the
ordinary means of transportation, and is
practically compelled to place himself in the
care of carriers of passengers, and so the
rule applied to carriers holds them to the
highest degree of care and diligence. On the
other hand, one desiring for his delectation
to make use of pleasure-giving devices
similar to the one in guestion is under no
impulsion of business or personal necessity.
He is seeking entertainment, and, when
invited by manager to avail himself of the
equipment provided by certain forms of
amusement, he can properly ask only that he
be not exposed by the carelessness of those
in charge of any given instrumentality to
harm preventable by care appropriate to the
operation of such instrumentality.
Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 A. 300,
303-04 (1923) (emphasis added).
Importantly, these cases involved amusement devices where
the passengers had surrendered themselves to the custody and
control of the owner or operator.

Yet, as pointed out by the

above cases, the rationale underlying the imposition of a higher
standard of care for common carriers is based on the reason or
occasion for which the instrumentality is used and the
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expectations of the passengers.

Persons with business or

personal necessity must often use common or public carriers to
transport themselves to their destinations and are thus compelled
to place themselves in the care of such common carriers.

In

contrast, amusement ride passengers are under no such compulsion
and make use of such rides for the entertainment they bring.
Accordingly, owners or operators of amusement devices should not
be treated as common carriers nor held to a common carrier
standard of care.
Further support for this distinction and the rationale which
underlies it results from the fact that courts have made a
distinction between public or common carriers and private
carriers of passengers and that a private carrier of passengers
for hire generally is required to exercise only ordinary care and
diligence for its passengers7 safety.

See 13 C.J.S. Carriers

§§ 529, 530, 531, 678.
Also, notwithstanding plaintiff's implications to the
contrary, there are many circumstances where the common carrier
standard of care is not applied to the owner or operator of an
instrumentality which requires its passengers to surrender
custody and control of their persons.

For example, a person who

gives a friend a ride to work in his or her car is not held to a
common carrier standard of care even though the friend
surrendered the custody and control of his or her person to the
owner or operator of the car.

To apply the rationale urged by

plaintiff would defeat the purpose for the distinction the law
makes between common carriers and owners or operators of other
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instrumentalities and would impose an unreasonable burden upon
the State of Utah and individuals and entities not before the
Court.
And finally, the facts presented in this case do not allow
for a result different from the court's decision below.

Although

plaintiff presented or proffered no evidence to the trial court
in support of her claim, defendant B & B provided the sworn
statement of counsel for the very agency empowered by law to
regulate common carriers in Utah, which evidence categorically
demonstrated that amusement rides are not considered common
carriers in Utah.

(See R. 346-47.)

Also, as noted at the trial

below, it was necessary for plaintiff to do more at trial than
just allege that the common carrier standard of care was
applicable.

Indeed, plaintiff had to present some evidence

concerning industry standards or that B & B was considered to be
a common carrier before that standard could apply to B & B.

This

plaintiff failed to do.
However, even assuming that the court erred in holding that
the common carrier standard of care did not apply, such error was
harmless.

The trial court held, and the jury was instructed,

that the applicable standard of care was ordinary care, being
that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would use
under the same or similar circumstances.

The court further

instructed the jury that "'ordinary care' implies the exercise of
reasonable diligence and such watchfulness, caution and foresight
as under all the circumstances of the particular case would be
exercised by a reasonably careful, prudent person."
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(R. 374.)

The use of the words "under the same or similar
circumstances" in the ordinary care standard allows the degree of
care to change with a change in circumstances.

Certain

circumstances will impose a higher degree of care than other
circumstances.

Thus, if the degree of care of a reasonably

prudent amusement ride owner or operator is equivalent to the
degree of care required of a common carrier, the amusement ride
owner or operator is held to such a degree of care by the
definition of the standard (i.e., reasonable care under the
circumstances).

The ordinary care standard, by definition,

imposes a duty to use a higher degree of care where the
circumstances warrant such.

In the case at bar, the jury was

instructed to hold B & B to the degree of care which a reasonably
prudent amusement ride owner or operator would use under the same
or similar circumstances.

This is all plaintiff can require, and

plaintiff did not even present evidence of what a reasonable and
prudent amusement ride owner or operator would use under similar
circumstances or that such care was equivalent to the degree of
care required of a common carrier under those circumstances.
Accordingly, any error in the court's ruling was harmless.
POINT III.
SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OBJECT DURING TRIAL TO THE
SPECIFIC TESTIMONY B & B'S EXPERT OFFERED, THIS COURT
SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL
REGARDING THAT TESTIMONY.
This Court has long held the position that failure of a
party to specifically object to testimony offered at trial at the
time it is offered prohibits that party from claiming error on
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appeal regarding the admission of such testimony.

Indeed, in

First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257,
1266 (Utah 1984), this Court ruled:

"an appellant has the

obligation to provide an adequate record on appeal for reviewing
a trial judge's ruling," and in the absence of a record, the
Court must presume that the trial court's rulings were correct.
Id. at 1266 (citation omitted).

This Court has also reiterated

the rule that "in the absence of a transcript, [the Court]
assume[s] that the proceedings at trial were regular and proper
and that the judgment was supported by competent and sufficient
evidence."

Bevan v. J.H. Construction Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443

(Utah 1983) (footnote omitted).

Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931,

934 (footnote omitted); accord In re Estate of Thorlev, 579 P.2d
927, 930 (Utah 1978).

The purpose behind this rule was stated by

this Court in Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987):
The absence of a transcript precludes a
meaningful review of the district court's
denial of [the plaintiff's] request for
relief from the judgment, particularly in
light of the party's contradictory
assertions. . . . As we stated in Sawyers v.
Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah 1976)
Appellate review of factual matters
can be meaningful, orderly, and
intelligent only in juxtaposition
to a record by which lower courts'
rulings and decisions on disputes
can be measured. In this case
without a transcript no such record
was available, and therefore no
measurement of the district court's
action can be made as urged upon us
by defendant.
Likewise, this Court has noted that "when crucial matters are not
in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the
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trial judge"; Mascaro v, Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 943 (Utah 1987),
"and the grounds for any objection must be distinctly and
specifically stated" since "the requirement of a specific
objection on the records insures that the trial court will
understand the basis of the objections and have an opportunity to
correct any errors before the case goes to the jury*"

Hansen v.

Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted), limited
on other grounds by Crookston, 817 P.2d 789.

In Hansen, this

Court ruled that the requirement that a plaintiff must state any
grounds for objection in order to have arguments related thereto
heard on appeal "assures that the appellate court will have a
record of the grounds asserted below.

If, however, the record on

appeal fails to demonstrate that the trial court has been given a
fair opportunity to avoid an error, we usually will not consider
any claim based on that error."

Id. at 16.

In that case, this

Court declined to allow the plaintiffs to supplement the record
on appeal to show that required objections were made
notwithstanding the fact that "a conference was held in chambers
and out of the presence of the court reporter at which some sort
of objections were made to the jury instructions.
exact nature of the objections made was not clear."

However, the
Id. at 17.

See also Zions First National Bank v. National American Title
Insurance, 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (although appellate
court may not defer to trial court's conclusions even on legal
question great benefit may have been derived therefrom providing
justification for refusing to consider appellant's claims for
first time on appeal).
35

Applying these rules of law to the ample facts set forth
above justifies this Court's refusal to consider plaintiff's
argument concerning specific testimony offered by Dr. Blotter,
which testimony was not objected to during trial below.

Indeed,

not only did plaintiff open the door to such testimony as
demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, supra. and Point IV,
infra, but testimony elicited from B & B's expert concerning
counterfeit bolts and flaws in the manufacturing process of the
same was also repeatedly presented without objection on the
record by plaintiff.

And, although plaintiff references in a

footnote in her brief that although no transcript is made of the
objection, "the context of this side bar conference requested is
quite clear," such that she should be allowed to raise her
argument on appeal regarding the testimony of B & B's expert (see
plaintiff's brief at 18 n.5), B & B entirely refutes plaintiff's
allegations that any such objection was made at trial just as it
refuted this argument by plaintiff below when plaintiff urged the
trial court to grant her a new trial (R. at 439-40).
In short, the record speaks for itself and nowhere during
trial did plaintiff object to such testimony as it came in.
the Montana Supreme Court noted in Phil-Co Feeds v. First
National Bank, 777 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Mont. 1989),
because the conference off the record is not
reported, this court cannot indulge in
speculation as to what the district court
learned at that time. Insofar as the
contention of the "appellant" is now raised,
no objection was made by [the appellant's]
counsel at the time of the action by the
judge nor is their any motion for mistrial.
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As

Therefore, there was no preservation of any
issue of judicial misconduct for appeal.
(Citation omitted.)
Accordingly, plaintiff's argument concerning the testimony
offered by B & B's expert should not be considered by this Court.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN ADMITTING THE
TESTIMONY OF B & B'S EXPERT WITNESS CONCERNING FLAWED
AND DEFECTIVE BOLTS, OR IF IT DID ERRf ANY ERROR WAS
HARMLESS.
Assuming this Court chooses to review plaintiff's argument
concerning the trial testimony of B & B's expert, which testimony
plaintiff herself triggered, elicited and did not object to at
trial, evidence presented at trial below clearly demonstrates the
appropriateness of the court's decision to allow the jury to
consider testimony regarding flawed or manufactured bolts in its
evaluation as to whether defendant's alleged negligence caused
the exaggerated "permanent injuries" of which plaintiff
complained.

This is particularly true given the fact that

plaintiff's expert himself opened the door to such testimony
prior to it being offered by B & B's expert witness.
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, when
considering arguments on appeal that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence, this Court must apply the clearly erroneous
standard of review.

(See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d

1116, 1118 (Utah 1989).)
1116, this Court ruled:

Indeed, in State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d
"in reviewing a challenge to a trial

court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we will not
disturb the ruling unless it clearly appears that it was in
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error."

Accord State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313f 1316 (Utah 1986);

State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985).

This

standard establishes that the trial court's superior position to
appraise and weigh proffered evidence will not be circumscribed
and its decision reversed unless based upon a review of the
entire evidence presented the appellate court is "'left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 n.5 (Utah 1987) (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Researching, 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969));
accord State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

Applying this

weighty standard of review in light of the entire evidence
presented at trial below mandates the conclusion that the trial
court did not clearly error in allowing evidence by B & B's
expert witness to be presented to the jury.
A.

Any error was harmless given evidence of flawed
bolts provided by plaintiff's own expert and
plaintiff's lack of surprise concerning such
evidence.

Even if the trial court erred in admitting evidence from
B & B's expert concerning a flawed and defective bolt causing the
accident in question, such error was harmless since (1) absent
the error there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the plaintiff; (2) the issue before the jury was
whether plaintiff's claimed injuries were caused by defendant's
negligence, regarding which there was overwhelming testimony in
support of the jury's verdict; (3) the overwhelming weight of
evidence presented supported the jury's verdict; and
(4) plaintiff's testimony lacked credibility.
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In short, the

confidence in the jury's verdict is not undermined by the
evidence offered by B & B's expert witness.

See Crookston v.

Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 799.
Since the inception of this suit and throughout trial
plaintiff was aware of the testimony to be elicited by
defendant's expert.

Indeed, by plaintiff's own admission in her

second amended complaint, she knew at least one year before trial
of the arguments defendant B & B would raise regarding flawed
bolts and the expert testimony necessary for B & B to present the
same.

Further, through plaintiff's own opposition to B & B's

motion for summary judgment and in the hearing held on the same
plaintiff acknowledged that testimony regarding flawed bolts
would need to be offered either through her own case presentation
or through defendant B & B's expert.
at 1-34.)

(See R. at 176-89; R. 548

Prior to trial, plaintiff also failed to argue in

opposition to B & B's designation of Dr. Blotter that any
surprise or prejudice would result from his testimony.

Instead,

plaintiff focused her argument solely on the theory that since
defendant B & B did not technically supplement its answer to
plaintiff's interrogatory concerning Dr. Blotter's anticipated
testimony regarding flawed bolts, the court could deny
presentation of such evidence at trial.

Importantly, in

reiterating on appeal this argument rejected below, plaintiff
ignores the fact that when defendant B & B raised a similar
argument to the trial court concerning plaintiff's attempt to
obtain expert economist testimony and to expand upon the
testimony of her own accident expert without supplementing
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plaintiff's answers to interrogatories concerning such experts'
proposed testimony, the trial court allowed such testimony even
though defendant B & B was arguably surprised by the same.
Further, as noted above, plaintiff opened the door to the
testimony by B & B's expert concerning the flawed bolt when
plaintiff's expert testified on the issue of whether a fraudulent
or defective bolt played any role in the accident.

Subsequent to

plaintiff's introduction of this issue, counsel for B & B,
counsel for plaintiff, and the court discussed the possible use
of a rebuttal expert by B & B to rebut the statements made by
plaintiff's expert on this very issue. At the court's
suggestion, B & B's expert was contacted and later testified on
this issue which was introduced by plaintiff's counsel through
testimony of her own expert.

(See R. at 442.)

Since plaintiff's counsel opened the door to this issue and
since the use by B & B of an expert to rebut the evidence
plaintiff herself introduced on this issue was discussed with
plaintiff's counsel and the court, Dr. Blotter's testimony
concerning such was certainly not a surprise nor prejudicial to
plaintiff and any error by the court in admitting the same was
harmless.
B.

(See R. at 445-46.)
Any error was harmless given the incredible
evidence offered by plaintiff at trial.

Also since the inception of this case and throughout trial
below, plaintiff sought to convince the jury that defendant was
responsible for permanent debilitating injuries she allegedly
suffered as a result of a minor accident on B & B's amusement
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ride.

Nevertheless, a simple review of the evidence presented

clearly demonstrates that plaintiff was not able to provide
persuasive testimony on the elements of her negligence claim to
justify the jury's verdict regarding the same.
In direct response to testimony offered by plaintiff and to
meet her allegations concerning causation and damage, defendant B
& B presented the testimony of its expert witness on those
issues.

Importantly, however, the jury likely ignored the

evidence presented by B & B's expert concerning flawed or
manufactured bolts and instead concluded that defendant B & B was
not negligent since it could not have caused the exaggerated
"permanent injuries" which plaintiff repeatedly stressed
throughout trial had resulted from this minor accident that was
described as gradually coming to a stop at a stop sign without
sliding.

(R. 550 at 430-40.)

The jury was instructed in part:
If you should find that it was within
the power of a party to produce stronger and
more satisfactory evidence than that which
was offered on a material point, you may view
with distrust any weaker and less
satisfactory evidence actually offered by the
party on that point, unless such failure is
satisfactorily explained.
(R. 392.)
The jury's verdict that defendant was not negligent as
claimed demonstrates that the jury was convinced by the stronger
and more satisfactory, competent, and credible evidence defendant
B & B presented refuting plaintiff's weak allegations and
unsatisfactory evidence that B & B had breached a duty
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proximately causing the exaggerated permanent injuries she
claimed she suffered.

Indeed, contrary to plaintiff's initial

allegations, plaintiff was forced to testify on cross-examination
that she had suffered injuries before and subsequent to the
accident for which she sought medical treatment.
280-87.)

(See R. 550 at

The jury also heard that months before the accident

plaintiff had been examined by health care professionals for
headaches, backaches, trouble sleeping, dizziness, double vision,
ringing in the ears, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains and
musculoskeletal concerns.

(R. 550 at 342-57.)

In short, the

jury heard evidence proving that years prior to the accident
plaintiff suffered from the very concerns she was alleging that
B & B had caused.
Also regarding the permanent injuries plaintiff claimed
resulted from the accident, the jury witnessed as the credibility
of plaintiff's own accident reconstructionist was severely
impugned when he was forced to admit that he had not made the
proper calculations necessary to draw reasonable conclusions
concerning the manner in which the accident occurred.

Further,

evidence not objected to by the plaintiff herein and offered by
B & B's expert witness demonstrated the unbelievable nature of
plaintiff's claims that after becoming disconnected the car
stopped as if slamming into a brick wall causing a passenger
behind her to come forward and hit plaintiff in the head.
In addition to the above, plaintiff's credibility also
suffered in the eyes of the jury when (1) plaintiff exaggerated
her injuries; (2) plaintiff attempted to attribute her claim of
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injuries solely to the accident in question when considerable
evidence pointed to prior and subsequent accidents and injuries;
(3) plaintiff exaggerated the impact of the accident;
(4) plaintiff was forced to concede that her testimony during
trial was different from that offered during her deposition;
(5) plaintiff was forced to admit that she had never told anyone
concerning her allegation that she had been hit in the back of
the head; (6) plaintiff conceded that the documents created
contemporaneously with the accident did not support her claim
that she had been hit in the head; (7) plaintiff's statement of
how the accident occurred was clearly refuted by other witnesses
who testified that the car in which plaintiff was riding did not
rest on the downward slope but was on the bottom of the same;
(8) no independent evidence was offered concerning the
plaintiff's claim that a child had hit her in the back of the
head when the lap bar on the following amusement ride car
allegedly failed; (9) plaintiff was forced to testify concerning
employment problems unrelated to this accident; and (10) medical
records presented to the jury proved that plaintiff suffered from
her claimed health concerns years prior to the accident in
question.
All in all, the jury had before it substantial, credible and
competent evidence supporting its verdict that defendant did not
breach a duty of care owed to the plaintiff in such a manner as
plaintiff claimed causing the exaggerated injuries of which she
complained.

Clearly the evidence, when marshalled in favor of

the jury's verdict, substantiates the conclusion that even absent
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the testimony of the flawed bolt reasonable minds could not have
differed as to plaintiff's alleged claims and there is no
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
plaintiff even if evidence offered by B & B's expert concerning
flawed bolts had not been admitted.

(See Erickson v. Wasatch

Manor, Inc.. 802 P.2d 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hardy v. Hardy,
776 P.2d 917 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,
120 (Utah 1989)) .
POINT V
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN ON APPEAL OF
MARSHALLING ALL TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S
VERDICT BEFORE CLAIMING THE INSUFFICIENCY THEREOF.
As this Court has repeatedly ruled,
A party claiming that the evidence does not
support a jury's verdict carries a heavy
burden. The evidence is considered in the
light most supportive of the verdict, and
[this Court] will not substitute [its]
judgment for that of the jury where the
verdict is supported by substantial and
competent evidence. To successfully attack
the verdict, an appellant must marshall all
the evidence supporting the verdict and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to that verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support it.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (citations
omitted).

Certainly this standard of review applies when

considering a claim such as that raised by plaintiff on appeal
here that in the absence of B S B's expert witness testimony on
the issue of a defective bolt "there would not have been
reasonably sufficient testimony to overcome the inference of B &
B's negligence" (plaintiff's brief at 38-42).

Applying this well

established standard to the case at hand demonstrates that
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plaintiffs argument fails regarding the insufficiency of the
evidence since she has not met her burden on appeal of first
marshalling all the evidence otherwise in support of the jury's
verdict.
CONCLOSION
Assuming the trial court erred in awarding defendant Curtis
summary judgment in this case, defendant B & B should not be
forced to relitigate a case it has won before the jury below.
Further, the court correctly applied the appropriate standard of
care respecting this defendant.

Also, plaintiff failed during

trial to properly preserve her objection concerning evidence
offered by B & B's expert witness, and assuming the court
otherwise erred in admitting such evidence, such error was
harmless given the fact that plaintiff herself presented such
testimony through her own expert witness, opened the door to the
presenting of the same by B & B's expert witness and there is no
reasonable likelihood of a different result absent the same.
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